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I. INTRODUCTION*
A working familiarity with the jurisdictional principles and procedures
involved in initiating legal proceedings against both domestic and foreign
corporations is essential to the successful resolution of the issues involved
in such corporate litigation. The important individual and societal inter-
ests involved in corporate litigation highlight the necessity of bringing the
corporate defendant within the jurisdiction of the state's courts.
On October 1, 1977, a revised code of civil procedure became effective
in Virginia. This revision, in addition to recent case law, significantly
affects the means of obtaining jurisdiction over corporations.
This note will review and analyze current jurisdictional principles and
procedures in three contexts: jurisdiction over domestic corporations; juris-
diction over foreign corporations; and the constitutional parameters gov-
erning the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Due necessar-
ily to the relative ease in obtaining jurisdiction over domestic corporations
as compared with asserting jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants,
the note, after setting forth the basic procedures for the former, will place
primary emphasis on the latter.
A. POTENTIAL JURISDICTION DEFINED
The assertion of valid jurisdiction' over a foreign or domestic corporation
* The student contributors are Robert E. Draim and Emily M. Trapnell.
1. Venue-the selection, in compliance with statutes, of a convenient trial court from
among those empowered to decide a case-is outside the scope of the text. Nevertheless, filing
an action in a court with improper venue will cause a plaintiff delay and expense; therefore,
at least a short discussion of it is justified.
Jurisdiction, the principle topic of this note, should not be confused with venue, though
both have to do with choosing the appropriate place for trial. Jurisdiction is the power of a
court to hear and decide a cause presented to it. Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v. Massaponax
Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317, 133 S.E. 812 (1926); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (Rev.
4th ed. 1968); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 601-01 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as JAMES & HAZARD]. On the other hand, venue, presupposing jurisdiction, is a privilege of
the defendant to have his cause heard in a forum which is fair and convenient relative to the
other courts which have the power to hear it. Hodgson v. Doe, 203 Va. 938, 128 S.E.2d 444
(1962); Dowdy v. Franklin, 203 Va. 7, 121 S.E.2d 817, 93 A.L.R.2d 1194 (1961); Tazewell
County School Board v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956); Southern Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317, 133 S.E. 812 (1926); VA. CODE ANN. §
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8.01-257 (Repl. Vol. 1977); JAMES & HAZARD, supra at 602-04. This dissimilarity of the doc-
trines has various collateral results. If a court lacks jurisdiction over a matter, it should
dismiss the complaint; without power, the court's judgment is void and subject to collateral
attack. But if a court lacks only venue, it should transfer the proceedings to a court that has
proper venue; inconvenience alone does not render a judgment void. See VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-258 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Also, an appellate court may raise the question of jurisdiction for
the first time on its own motion. However, if the defendant does not object quickly to the
venue of the trial court, he will be deemed to have waived his privilege. Texaco Inc. v.
Runyon, 207 Va. 367, 150 S.E.2d 132 (1966); Jones v. Powell, 154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539 (1930);
Morgan v. Pennsylvania Ry., 148 Va. 272, 138 S.E. 566 (1927). In origin, jurisdiction is both
constitutional (the power of the sovereign) and statutory (usually, the delegation of the power
by the sovereign to its courts). While venue might be a matter of constitutional law, U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14, it is now primarily statutory. Dowdy v. Franklin,
203 Va. 7, 121 S.E.2d 817 (1961); Solomon v..Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 187 Va. 240, 46 S.E.2d
360 (1948); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. J.E. Boder Co., 144 Va. 154, 131 S.E. 245 (1926). Thus
all of these-the differing definitions, the differing effects of mistaken selection, the differing
times for objecting, and the differing sources of law-serve to distinguish jurisdiction and
venue, power and convenience.
In Virginia, until recently, a study of the venue statutes could be frustrating. For many
years, the Virginia courts and legislature confounded the doctrines of jurisdiction and venue.
See VA. CODE COMM'N REPORT, REvISION OF TITLE 8.1 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 167 (H. Del.
Doc. No. 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as CODE COMM'N REPORT].
In one case the state supreme court held that the word "jurisdiction" was intended to mean
"venue". Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E.2d 582 (1963). For its part, the legislature
enacted "mandatory venue" provisions, which the court reasonably understood to be jurisdic-
tional. Davis v. Marr, 200 Va. 479, 106 S.E.2d 722 (1959). Cases were conceivable in which
no venue was proper.
The revisers of the new civil procedure title unriddled most of the problems. They used
two sections of the CODE, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-257 & -258 (Repl. Vol. 1977), to reaffirm the
distinction between jurisdiction and venue. More than that, they collected almost all the
venue provisions in a single chapter, chapter five, of the revised Title 8.01. Id. §§ 8.01-257 to
-267. Only two relevant venue statutes, as acknowledged in § 8.01-259, remain outside the
chapter: venue for writs of quo warranto is controlled by § 8.01-638; and venue for injunctions
is controlled by § 8.01-621. Except for these (and several other provisions irrelevant to corpo-
rate law), venue as enacted in chapter five supersedes all other venue provisions in the
Virginia Code, wherever located. Id. § 8.01-259.
To impose order on its broad scope, chapter five subdivides venue for state claimants into
preferred (Category A) venue and permissible (Category B) venue. Id. §§ 8.01-260 to -262.
Wherever the statute setting out preferred venue applies-as in a review of administrative
proceedings, § 8.01-261.1., or in an action for attachment, § 8.01-261.2.-failure to follow its
terms is subject to objection. Id. § 8.01-261. However, preferred venue controls only limited
classes of cases; proper venue for most actions against corporations, domestic or foreign, will
be determined by the statute on permissible venue, § 8.01-262. Under it, venue is allowed in
the places likely to be fair and convenient for trial, e.g., where the defendant resides, where
the defendant has a registered agent, where the defendant regularly or systematically con-
ducts his affairs or business. Id. § 8.01-262.1 to .3. In any event, some venue will be found. If
no other venue is proper, the Code permits bringing a suit where property can be attached,
id. § 8.01-262.9, or as a last resort, where the plaintiff resides. Id. § 8.01-262.10. See also id.
§ 8.01-263 (multiple parties).
There are really two bases for objecting to the venue of a state court. The first is that the
venue does not comport with the preferred-permissible statutes described in the preceding
paragraph. But notwithstanding those statutes, a defendant may also object to venue for
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is a dual process. The threshold determination is whether the court in
which the action is initiated has subject matter jurisdiction of the case,
that is, whether the court has been empowered to hear cases of the kind
before it. If so empowered, the court has "potential jurisdiction"' of the
proceeding and may adjudicate the issues involved in that proceeding after
its "active jurisdiction" has been perfected. 3
B. ACTIVE JURISDICTION DEFINED
Active jurisdiction connotes the actual or constructive presence before
the court of the parties and/or property involved in the litigation,' effected
through valid service of process, and it allows the court to constitutionally
determine the case.5 If either potential or active jurisdiction is lacking, a
"good cause", good cause including inconvenience, prejudice, or the interest of the judge. Id.
§ 8.01-264; CoDE COMM'N REPORT, supra, at 179. The distinction is not merely academic. If
objection is based on statutory interpretation, the state supreme court can give a plenary
review of the decision of the trial court. See id. § 8.01-258. But objections to venue for good
cause are addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. § 8.01-267, and presumably his
decision is only reviewed for abuse of discretion.
If the defendant believes that either the categorical statutes or "good cause" gives him the
privilege to change venue, he must file a written motion early in his responsive pleadings.
Id. § 8.01-276. In the circuit court, he must object within twenty-one days after service of
process or within whatever time the circuit court has allowed for filing responsive pleadings.
Id. § 8.01-265. In the district court the defendant must object on or before the day of trial.
Id. The objection is still considered timely "even if other pleadings are filed by the defendant
prior to the expiration of the time for objection." Id. (Revisers' Note). A motion objecting to
venue must state where venue would be proper. Id. § 8.01-276.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970) for the federal venue provisions.
2. Tazewell Co. School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 92 S.E.2d 497 (1956); James v. Powell,
154 Va. 96, 152 S.E. 539 (1930); Nash v. Harman, 148 Va. 610, 139 S.E. 273 (1927); Morgan
v. Pennsylvania Ry., 148 Va. 272, 138 S.E. 566 (1927); Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317, 133 S.E. 812 (1926).
For purposes of this note, potential jurisdiction will be examined in light of the "power"
to hear certain cases that the Virginia general district courts and circuit courts possess. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1975) & § 17-123 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If a proceeding is
brought against a domestic or foreign corporation in the Virginia state courts, the jurisdic-
tional requirements of those courts apply. These requirements are discussed in section II
infra, and will not be repeated in section IV infra, dealing with jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. The emphasis in section IV infra, is on the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations under the long-arm statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
3. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Ry., 148 Va. 272, 138 S.E. 566 (1927). "'Potential jurisdiction',
• . . after valid service of process on the parties, gives the court 'active jurisdiction' and
empowers it to hear the case and enter a valid judgment therein." Id. at 277, 138 S.E. at 567.
4. Id.; Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v. Massaponax Sand & Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317, 133
S.E. 812 (1926).
5. Minimum due process concerns require that notice and an opportunity to be heard be
given to defendants. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Moore v. Smith, 177 Va. 621, 15 S.E.2d 48 (1941).
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court cannot validly hear a case, and a case so heard is a nullity.' In essence
then, potential jurisdiction refers to a court's general power to adjudicate,
while active jurisdiction refers to its ability to do so in a particular case.
II. POTENTIAL JURISDICTION OVER DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS
The requirements for the assertion of potential jurisdiction over domes-
tic or foreign corporations' are identical in the state general district courts,2
and are identical in the state circuit courts.' Since the provisions of each
court are applicable to litigation involving either a domestic or a foreign
corporation, the requirements will not be restated when the discussion
turns exclusively to foreign corporations.'
A. COURTS No'r OF RECORD
Courts not of record in Virginia-the general district courts for this
purpose-are a legislative creation, having no inherent or constitutional
jurisdiction, and thus their potential jurisdiction is strictly limited to those
areas expressly granted by the General Assembly. Moreover, a general
6. Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946); Farant Investment Corp. v. Fran-
cis, 138 Va. 417, 122 S.E. 141 (1924).
1. A domestic corporation created by the laws of the State of Virginia is technically either
a "stock" or a "nonstock" corporation, the principal and most obvious distinction being that
the former is authorized to issue stock while the latter is not. Compare the Virginia Stock
Corporations Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1 to -200 (Repl. Vol. 1973) with the Virginia Non-
stock Corporations Act, id. §§ 13.1-201 to -300. Insofar as service of process is concerned, there
is no real distinction between the two types, and the discussion here is applicable to both.
A foreign corporation is, of course, created by the laws of a state other than Virginia.
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
3. See id. § 17-123 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
4. See sections IV & V infra, which concentrate primarily on obtaining jurisdiction under
the long-arm statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977). It should be remembered,
however, that the jurisdictional requirements (e.g., amount in controversy) of the state courts
are still applicable when jurisdiction is asserted under the long-arm statute against a foreign
corporation, if the action is brought in state court.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See, e.g., Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 40
S.E.2d 260 (1946), wherein dismissal of a case by a trial justice was necessitated when it
became apparent that title to real property was involved in the case, there being no potential
jurisdiction in that court for cases involving title to realty.
If a case is before the wrong court, or if any other requirements for potential jurisdiction
are lacking, the court will dismiss the suit when the error is brought to its attention. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Pettyjohn, 88 Va. 296, 13 S.E. 431 (1891).
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district court's jurisdiction is limited to the geographical territory that it
serves 6 and by the amount in controversy restriction in the jurisdictional
grant.'
Basically, the general district court enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction
of personal claims8 of up to five hundred dollars and concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the circuit courts for claims exceeding five hundred dollars but
not exceeding five thousand dollars.9 Attachment actions where the claim
does not exceed five thousand dollars are also cognizable in the general
district courts.' 0
It would seem, therefore, that small claims against domestic corpora-
tions for any of the acts set out in the district courts' jurisdictional grant,
assuming the territorial limitation is also met, are properly before such a
tribunal. However, in light of the limited. jurisdictional sphere of the gen-
eral district courts, most, if not all, litigation involving corporations, both
domestic and foreign, will be in the courts of record.
B. COURTS OF RECORD
In contrast to the courts not of record, the courts of record-the circuit
courts here-are given potential jurisdiction by the Virginia Constitution."
The constitution's grant of potential jurisdiction to the courts of record,
codified by the General Assembly," provides for original and general juris-
diction of "all cases in chancery and civil cases at law. .... 1 Thus, the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts is limited territorially only by the bounda-
ries of the state, " and not by the geographical extent of the various cir-
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See id. § 16.1-69.6 (Cum. Supp. 1977) for a
compilation of the territorial limits of all the courts not of record in the Commonwealth.
7. Id. § 16.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
8. Id. § 16.1-77 (1) "[A]ny claim to specific personal property or to any debt, fine or other
money, or to damages for breach of contract or for injury done to property, real or personal,
or for any injury to the person .. " Id.
9. Id. Attorney's fees contracted for in the instrument and interest are not considered in
the jurisdictional amount.
10. Id. § 16.1-77(2). Interest and attorney's fees are again not considered.
11. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-123 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. Id. [emphasis added]. There are two exceptions to this broad grant of power: the
circuit courts have no potential jurisdiction in "cases at law to recover personal property or
money not of greater value than one hundred dollars, exclusive of interest;" and there is no
jurisdiction over cases assigned to any other tribunal. Id. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 for the
jurisdiction of the Virginia Supreme Court.
14. Venue considerations, however, will affect where the action is brought or eventually
transferred, although statewide potential jurisdiction exists. See section I, note 1 supra. See
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.10. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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cuits.'5 There is no limitation on the amount in controversy, except as a
minimum standard.' 6
In light of the general district court's limited potential jurisdiction and
the statewide potential jurisdiction of the courts of record, it is clear that
substantial corporate legal proceedings, when brought in Virginia state
court, will be in the circuit courts. However, in order to perfect the poten-
tial jurisdiction conferred on the circuit courts and thereby constitution-
ally hear a case, the circuit court must have active jurisdiction in the
proceeding, obtained by valid service of process.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS
A. DUE PROCESS
Assuming that there is potential jurisdiction over the domestic corpora-
tion in a particular matter, the due process safeguard of notice to the
defendant must be met in order to obtain active jurisdiction.1 This is the
purpose of service of process, to inform the defendant that an action has
been filed against it so that it may prepare to defend its interests.2
The manner of service of process is governed by statute.' Notice being
the purpose of service of process, the Virginia Code naturally provides a
rather rigid procedure to be followed in serving process, with the goal being
to provide actual notice to the defendant. Since actual notice is the ulti-
mate goal of service of process, process is deemed sufficient if it results in
actual notice to the defendant even though it is neither served nor accepted
in the manner required by statute or the Rules of the Supreme Court.4 This
is obviously an important provision which may save the action from dis-
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-119.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) for a compilation of the geographi-
cal limits of the state's judicial circuits.
16. See id. § 17-123.
1. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are fundamental requirements of constitutional
due process. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Moore v. Smith, 177 Va. 621, 15 S.E.2d 48 (1941).
2. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
3. See generally, Recent Legislation, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 245, 262 (1977).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-288 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Suits for divorce or annulment are excepted
from this and other provisions dealing with service of process, the procedure in such actions
generally being more rigid. The special provisions on service of process in such actions are
beyond the scope of this Note and will not be mentioned hereafter. However, the Reviser's
Note makes it clear that § 8.01-288 is intended to apply to all defendants, "e.g., a corporation,
not just to an individual. . . ." Reviser's Note [CoDE COMM'N RE-PORT], id. § 8.01-288.
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missal when the procedure for service is not followed to the letter, but it
should not, of course, be relied upon in serving process.
B. How PROCESS MAY BE SERVED GENERALLY'
Title 8.01 of the Virginia Code provides for statewide service of process;
that is, process issued from any court in the state may be directed to and
served by the sheriff in "any county, city, or town in the Commonwealth."'
Further, process may be served either by the sheriff within his own county
or city or in any county or city contiguous thereto,7 or by any disinterested
party aged eighteen or older.8
Unlike the provision for service on natural persons,9 the Code seems to
allow alternate modes of service on a domestic corporation.'0 It appears
that this is qualified only as to service on the registered agent." This
5. The statutory provisions discussed in this section are only directory, not mandatory.
This is as it must be if the savings section on service of process, discussed in text at notes 3-
4 supra, is to have any effect.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-292 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This eliminates the necessity of plaintiffs
deciding in advance where the cause of action arose when venue is based on that determina-
tion; or perhaps more accurately, it eliminates the necessity for dismissal of the action when
it later appears that plaintiff's decision in this regard was incorrect.
7. Id. §§ 8.01-293 & -295. The latter section also provides that service is not invalid because
it is not directed to an officer or if directed to an officer and subsequently executed by
someone else, if it is good in other respects.
8. Id. § 8.01-293. There are no territorial limits within which such a person must serve the
process comparable to those provided for sheriffs.
9. Id. § 8.01-296. This section provides for consecutive modes of service. The modes are
listed in their order of preference and one is available only where service cannot be made
under the preceding mode.
10. Id. § 8.01-299. The section allows personal service or substituted service. There is no
express requirement that personal service be attempted before substituted service is made
as there is in the section dealing with service on natural persons.
11. Id. § 8.01-299.2. Every domestic corporation is required to have both a registered office
and a registered agent. The registered agent must be either an officer or director of the
corporation, a member of the Virginia State Bar or a professional corporation and the regis-
tered office must be the business office of such agent. See id. §§ 13.1-9 & -209 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
Code § 8.01-299.2 directs that substituted service must be made on stock corporations "in
accordance with § 13.1-11 and on nonstock corporations in accordance with § 13.1-210."
These sections are identical. See id. §§ 13.1-11 (Repl. Vol. 1973) & 13.1-210 (Cum. Supp.
1977). The qualification is in these sections which provide that substituted service is available
only where the corporation has no registered agent or "its registered agent cannot with
reasonable diligence be found at the registered office .. " In effect, then, substituted service
is available in these circumstances even where no effort has been made to serve an officer or
director under the statute.
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qualification is logical since usually the sole purpose of the registered agent
is to receive service of process on the corporation.' 2
The Code provides that process may be served on a domestic corporation
by personal or substituted service.' 3
1. Personal Service
Personal service may be made on any officer, director or registered agent
of the corporation.' The names and addresses of the registered agent,
directors and principal officers of the corporation must be filed with the
State Corporation Commission'5 and will be provided to plaintiff upon
request. These names and addresses "as last filed" are "... conclusive for
the purposes of service of process."' 6
2. Substituted Service
Substituted service is made in the appropriate case by service on the
clerk of the State Corporation Commission or on any of his staff who must
then forward it by registered or certified mail to the corporation at its
registered office.'"
Whether process is served personally on an officer, director or the regis-
tered agent, or by substituted service at the registered office, the corpora-
tion is deemed to have received notice even though the person so notified
fails to act on the notice.'"
12. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-11 (Repl. Vol. 1973) & 13.1-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. Id., § 8.01-299 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
14. Id. This provision does not apply to municipal and quasi-governmental corporations
which must be served in accordance with id. § 8.01-300 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This section
specifies the officers who may be served in a particular case and provides that service is valid
if a copy is left with the person in charge of the office or any officer designated. Id.
Also, where the plaintiff is an officer of the corporation being sued, service of process on
him is insufficient to notify the corporation because of his obviously contrary interest. See
Beck v. Semones, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 (1926). This problem was recognized by the
legislature and expressly provided for in the area of service on partnerships. VA. CODE ANN.,
§ 8.01-304 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
15. The name of the registered agent, the address of the registered office, and the names
and addresses of the initial directors must be set forth in the articles of incorporation. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-49 & -231 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Also, the name of the registered agent, the
address of the registered office, and the names and addresses of the directors and principal
officers must be set forth in the annual report filed with the Commissioner. Id. §§ 13.1-120
& -282.
16. Id. §§ 13.1-11 (Repl. Vol. 1973) & 13.1-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Danville & W.R.R. v. Brown, 90 Va. 340, 18 S.E. 278 (1893). However, if
defendant fails to respond, plaintiff who seeks a default judgment in the circuit court must
1978]
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C. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS IN CERTAIN ACTIONS
Beyond the provisions for service of process on domestic corporations
generally, the requirements of service vary in certain actions which are
dealt with particularly by statute.
In attachment, garnishment and execution proceedings, process may be
served on any agent of the corporation wherever he may be found within
the state.'9 This provides substantial protection for creditors, since it
allows for service to be made in these instances much more rapidly than
would normally be the case.
When a corporation is being operated by a trustee or a receiver, process
may be served on that person or, if there is more than one, on either of
them.20 This is the preferred mode of service on such a corporation and only
if such service may not be had may process be served by one of the gener-
ally allowable modes previously discussed.2 '
IV. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The protection of life and property within a state's boundaries is a pri-
mary concern of state government.' The state's vital interest in providing
a forum for actions "has necessarily expanded as its citizens have become
more mobile and markets have become nationwide in scope. . ". ."I Sub-
jecting foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of Virginia courts, where
permitted by due process considerations, enables the fulfillment of that
vital interest.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICITON UNDER THE LONG-ARM STATUTE
Personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations may be obtained by ap-
plication of Virginia's "long-arm" statute.2 The central provision for this
now provide at least three days notice by registered or certified mail to defendant at its last-
known address or at the address where process was originally served. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
427.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-302 (Repl. Vol. 1977) [emphasis added].
20. Id. § 8.01-303.
21. Id.
1. Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 455, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968).
2. Id. at 455-56, 164 S.E.2d at 707.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 1977), formerly id. §§ 8-81.2 to -81.5 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). Three of the five sections which constituted Chapter 4.1 under old Title 8 have
been retained verbatim in new Title 8.01. The first of the unchanged provisions is that
provision defining the word "person" as used in the chapter. Id. § 8.01-328 (Repl. Vol. 1977),
formerly id. § 8-81.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Of significance in this discussion is that such
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purpose under new Title 8.01 is Code subsection 8.01-328.1.A.,4 which au-
thorizes the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations for
causes of action arising out of any one of several activities enumerated
therein. Any one of the paragraphs of subsection (A) will provide a basis
for personal jurisdiction, although in some cases more than one paragraph
may apply. 5 Furthermore, it is clear that each paragraph will support a
cause of action under any theory of law.6 It must be noted that the acts
listed which may result in the conferring of personal jurisdiction are acts
done directly or by an agent.7 This inclision of the principle of agency is
of course important in order that the provision apply to non-natural per-
sons such as corporations. Each paragraph will now be considered by ana-
lyzing those cases-state and federal-in which the particular paragraph
was the basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
1. Transacting Any Business in the State
Emphasizing the word any, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that
this provision requires only a single transaction in Virginia to confer juris-
diction on its court In so ruling, the court reasoned that the purpose of
definition includes corporations. The other two provisions retained verbatim are the former
id. §§ 8-81.2 & -81.5 (Cum. Supp. 1976), currently id. §§ 8.01-328.1 & -330 (Repl. Vol. 1977),
respectively. The provision concerning venue, id. § 8-81.4 (Cum. Supp. 1976), for cases where
jurisdiction is based on the long-arm statute, has been deleted; reference should be made
instead to the newly revised venue provisions. See id. §§ 8.01-257 to -267 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
Finally, the provision dealing with service of process under the long-arm statute, id. § 8-81.3
(Cum. Supp. 1976), has been revised in id. § 8.01-329 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See section V infra.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
5. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 222 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]; see, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Molins Orgs.
Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Va. 1966).
6. HANDBOOK supra note 5, at 222. "For example, a claim arising from 'transacting busi-
ness' may sound in contract, tort, or quasi contract." See, e.g., Snow v. Clark, 263 F. Supp.
66 (W.D. Va. 1967) (jurisdiction for action in tort based upon paragraph (6)).
Paragraph (7) reflects the legislative finding that a contract to insure is a sufficient ground
upon which to assert jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies when the insurance con-
tract's subject matter was in the state at the time of contracting. See section VI, notes 60 &
61 infra.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
8. Rules 4(e) and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party not an inhabitant
of the state or found therein to be served with a summons in a federal court under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by a state statute. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e)&(f). See
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965).
9. John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E. 2d 664 (1971). The
court stated that as the provision requires only one transaction, "it is a single act statute
. ." Id. at 740, 180 S.E.2d at 667. The use of the term "single act" by the court in Kolbe
should not be confused with the common meaning of "single act" as it relates to the "tortious
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the long-arm statute is to assert jurisdiction, to the extent permissible
under the due process clause,'0 over nonresidents who engage in some pur-
poseful activity" in this state. As a practical matter, the attorney arguing
for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation pursuant to paragraph
(1) should not limit himself to a discussion of the particular transaction
from which the cause of action arose. The courts must be mindful not only
of the literal application of the jurisdictional statute, but also of due pro-
cess considerations." Thus, a court may be influenced, as was the court in
John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., '" by the entire scope of the
foreign corporation's contacts with the state, including unrelated transac-
tions.'"
To determine in any given case whether personal jurisdiction may be
asserted over a foreign corporation pursuant to paragraph (1), there must
be an analysis of the particular facts and circumstances involved.'5 It is
act" provision of some state long-arm statutes. See notes 44 & 45 infra, and accompanying
text.
The court in Kolbe held that the defendant, a California corporation, did transact business
within the meaning of the statute. A manufacturer's representative was authorized to secure
from the plaintiff, a Virginia corporation, a written order for the sale of chairs to be delivered
directly to North Carolina from California. The defendant's regional representative had sold
other Chromodern merchandise to Virginia dealers, amounting to $3,446.60 in sales, and the
order involved in the Kolbe transaction was secured in Virginia. Despite the court's an-
nouncement that a single transaction is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the court did not
appear to base personal jurisdiction over the defendant solely upon the securing in Virginia
of the written order for the Kolbe transaction. The court held that it would not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require the defendant to submit to
jurisdiction for the following reason: "Chromodern's actions, both in this transaction and in
others shown by the evidence, delineate a pattern of activities intended to develop the Chro-
modern market in Virginia and to reap economic benefit therefrom." Id. at 741, 180 S.E.2d
at 668. It has been noted that while a single transaction may constitute the basis for jurisdic-
tion, cases so holding generally involve substantial contacts with the state asserting jurisdic-
tion. Cornell Univ. Med. Col. v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara, 38 Cal. App. 3d 311, 318, 113
Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (1974).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. The notion of "purposeful activity" is obviously not literally precise, as the provision
of the long-arm statute dealing with breach of warranty requires only that the defendant have
reasonably expected the plaintiff to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in Virginia.
See VA. Coon ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.5. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
12. See generally section VI infra.
13. 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971).
14. But see Cornell Univ. Med. Col. v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara, 38 Cal. App. 3d 311,
316-17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (1974), in which the court held that "[llittle emphasis or
importance may reasonably be placed upon..." the defendant's wholly unrelated activities.
15. John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667
(1971). For other cases considering the "transacting any business" provision of Virginia's
long-arm statute, Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
[Vol. 12:369
JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS
generally held that neither the defendant nor his agent need be physically
present in the state for the purpose of transacting business within the
meaning of the long-arm statute.'" Some courts have established certain
rules to guide the evaluation of the particular facts in determining whether
the corporation was transacting business. Under the New York long-arm
statute,'" for instance, the general rules laid down by the courts are stated
as follows: "Mere execution of a contract in New York, without more, is
insufficient to constitute transaction of business as is mere negotiation;
negotiation or execution plus other contacts, however, may suffice."' 8 The
obvious danger of such a statement is that it may lose its identity as a mere
guide and become instead a hard and fast rule.'9
In general, courts have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent buyers, as opposed to sellers, under the "transacting any business"
clause of their state long-arm statutes."0 Where jurisdiction is extended
over a nonresident purchaser, that purchaser has usually "either initiated
the relationship or actively participated in negotiations and plans for pro-
duction ... ."I' Nevertheless, it is clear that purchases can constitute the
basis for transacting business within a state.2 No distinction is made in
paragraph (1) between seller and purchaser, nor is any reference made to
either." Only by an analysis of the particular facts and circumstances of a
given case can it be determined whether the foreign corporation has trans-
acted any business in Virginia.24
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Marston v. Gant, 351 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Va. 1972); V & V
Mining Supply, Inc. v. Matway, 295 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Va. 1969); Dotson v. Kwiki Systems,
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Va. 1968); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Molins Orgs., Ltd.,
261 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Va. 1966).
16. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880, 882 (D. Col. 1972).
17. N.Y. Civ. PHAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1977).
18. Impex Metals Corp. v. Oremet Chem. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
19. No such rule has been expressly established in any case considering the Virginia long-
arm statute.
20. Vacu-Maid, Inc. v. Covington, 530 P.2d 137, 141 (Okla. 1974). See, e.g. Geneva Indus.,
Inc., v. Copeland Constr. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1970); "Automatic" Sprinkler
Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423 (1972).
21. Vacu-Maid, Inc. v. Covington, 530 P.2d 137, 143 (Okla. 1974).
The reason most often given for this buyer-seller distinction is that the seller is the
aggressor or initiator in the forum and by selling his product in the state he receives
the benefit and protection of the forum state's laws, and hopefully profits from its
business therein. Further, allowing jurisdiction over "passive" buyers would tend to
extinguish state lines and also to discourage out-of-state purchasers from dealing with
resident sellers.
Id. at 141.
22. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
24. John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667
(1971).
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Under paragraph (1), the cause of action must arise out of the foreign
corporation's transacting of business;" it is not sufficient that the foreign
corporation's transaction of business constituted merely an antecedent fact
having no real relation to the plaintiffs cause of action.2 6 But if the cause
of action did in fact arise from the corporation's transaction of business in
Virginia, "the court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because the
subject matter extends beyond the state boundaries."27
2. Contracting to Supply Services or Things in the State
Providing jurisdiction in such cases helps satisfy the state's legitimate
interest in protecting the rights of its residents under contracts with non-
resident corporations.2 1 Paragraphs (1) and (2)21 are obviously closely re-
lated, as both may likely apply in commercial dealings with a foreign
corporation. Where, however, paragraph (2) applies to a set of facts but
paragraph (1) does not, as in the case of an unexecuted contract negotiated
outside Virginia and with no other related activities in the state, due
process considerations may preclude the assertion of jurisdiction."
It should be noted that paragraph (2) contemplates contracts to supply
in Virginia 2 ' Thus, if the contract with the foreign corporation calls only
for the supplying of services or things outside the state, paragraph (2)
simply does not apply.32 In such a case, it may still be possible to demon-
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
26. See, e.g., Krone v. AMI, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
27. Dotson v. Kwiki Systems, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Va. 1968). In Dotson, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a Missouri corporation which manufactured coin-
operated car washes, had orally agreed to give plaintiffs exclusive distributorships for Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky. The distributorships could not be revoked without first
giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to conclude the agreement in writing. The plaintiffs later
discovered that other parties had been appointed as exclusive distributors in West Virginia
and Kentucky, but there was nothing to indicate that their Virginia operations had been
encroached upon. The defendants were nevertheless held subject to jurisdiction under the
transacting business rationale.
28. Engineering Assocs. of New England v. B & L Liquidating Corp., 115 N.H. 508, 345
A.2d 900, 902 (1975).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.1. & 2. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
30. See generally section VI infra. If the contract designates Virginia law as governing the
contract, it may be argued that despite an absence of other actual contacts, such designation
is itself a significant voluntary contact, mitigating due process concerns. See Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), holding that although designation of New York
law as governing the contract would not alone permit recourse to New York's long-arm
statute, it did constitute a significant contact within the state.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
32. For example, jurisdiction was based upon subsection (A)(1), but could not have been
based upon subsection (A)(2), in John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736,
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strate enough contacts that the foreign corporation may be deemed to have
transacted business in Virginia within the meaning of paragraph (1). 3 The
reason why paragraph (2) does not provide jurisdiction based on contracts
to supply services or things outside the state is undoubtedly grounded upon
due process considerations. 4
Paragraph (2) of the long-arm statute should not be interpreted as con-
ferring personal jurisdiction for a cause of action arising from a foreign
corporation's contracting to purchase-as opposed to supply-services or
things in this state.3 The payment of money for goods supplied or services
Tendered presents the converse situation as that envisioned by paragraph
(2). In Davis H. Elliott Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co.,36 for example, it was
held that personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation pursuant to para-
graph (2) could not be based upon a contract cancellation agreement 37
between the parties calling for the defendant to make payment to the
plaintiff by mail in Virginia.
3 1
In order for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to be obtained under
paragraph (2), the cause of action must arise from the corporation's con-
180 S.E.2d 664 (1971). The contract called for the defendants to deliver the chairs to North
Carolina.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977); see, e.g., John G. Kolbe, Inc. v.
Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E. 2d 664 (1971).
34. This provision of the long-arm statute is already of questionable constitutionality in
its literal application where the nonresident's only contact with Virginia is that the Common-
wealth is the contemplated situs of the contract's execution. If subsection (A)(2) included
within its scope contracts to supply services or things outside this state, the provision would
by its terms cover the situation in which the defendant had no actual contact with Virginia;
this would clearly be violative of the due process clause. See generally, section VI infra.
35. But see, Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 740 (1965),
questioning this distinction.
36. 64 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Va. 1974).
37. Under the original contract, the plaintiff, a Virginia corporation, was to engineer,
supervise, provide labor and materials for, and construct electrical transmission and distribu-
tion lines on an island in the British West Indies. After the plaintiff had begun performance,
the parties agreed to terminate the contract. They entered into a contract of cancellation in
Kentucky, in which it was provided that the defendant agreed to pay for the return of
plaintiff's men and equipment to Virginia. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defen-
dant owed a sum of money under the terms of the cancellation agreement.
38. The court distinguished this case from the case of Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa,
443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971), in which jurisdiction was obtained under subsection (A)(2). In
Elefteriou, a statute of the United States required that a seaman discharged by a vessel
making foreign voyages be paid his wages within certain time limits. The court in Elliott
noted that Elefteriou involved a statute of the United States and a maritime sea injury,
neither of which existed in Elliott. The implication appears to be that in such maritime cases,
jurisdiction by necessity, due to the lack of an alternative forum, may justify a liberal applica-
tion of a state's long-arm statute.
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tracting to supply services or things in Virginia.3 9 A First Circuit case,4"
construing the same provision of the Massachusetts long-arm statute,"
illustrates the importance of this requirement. The plaintiff bought a
motor scooter in Pennsylvania which was manufactured in Italy by the
defendant corporation. Due to an alleged manufacturing defect, the plain-
tiff was injured. At the time of the injury, the defendant sold its scooters
to a Massachusetts corporation under a franchise agreement. The plaintiff
brought suit in Massachusetts, attempting service under that state's long-
arm statute. The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
from and was not connected with any shipment into or services within
Massachusetts. "It would be an unwarranted extension of the statute to
include shipments elsewhere merely because, under the same contract,
goods unrelated to the cause of action may have been introduced into the
commonwealth."4 2
3. Causing Tortious Injury
Paragraphs (3) and (4)43 distinguish the Virginia long-arm statute from
the "single-act" statutes of other states.4 The single-act statutes, which
have but one "tortious act" provision, provide personal jurisdiction for a
cause of action arising from the commission of a tortious act within the
state.4 5 These single-act statutes have been broadly construed46 and pro-
vide a farther-reaching jurisdictional power than do paragraphs (3) and (4)
of the Virginia long-arm statute. Paragraph (4) is more restrictive than
paragraph (3), in order to ensure that the defendant has additional con-
tacts with the state when the act or omission occurs outside Virginia.17 It
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.2. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
40. Singer v. Piaggio & C., 420 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1970).
41. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
42. Singer v. Piaggio & C., 420 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1970).
43. It should be remembered that the long-arm statute pertains to personal jurisdiction
over "persons", including corporations that act through agents. Because the long-arm statute
is jurisdictional and does not create any additional causes of action, there is no reason to
believe that the principles of agency embodied in the statute differ from those of the common
law. Thus, application of those principles to negate the existence of a master-servant relation-
ship could result in the denial of personal jurisdiction over the corporation sought to be
charged for the tort committed.
44. See generally, Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 744-51
(1965).
45. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1965).
46. See, e.g., Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
47. It was held in St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148, 152 (W.D. Va. 1966), that where
the legislature has not expressly stated that the courts are not to exercise jurisdiction beyond
the limits defined in the statute, the courts may exercise jurisdiction beyond the express
authorization of the statute to the limits of due process. Thus, it was held in effect that the
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should be noted that the added requirements are phrased in the alterna-
tive. It is enough, for example, that the foreign corporation derive substan-
tial revenue in Virginia, without any necessity that it also regularly do or
solicit business, or engage in any persistent course of conduct.48 Further-
more, it is not necessary that these added contacts bear any relationship
to the act or omission which caused the injury. 9
The restrictive language of paragraph (4) is the same, verbatim, as that
in paragraph (5) dealing with breach of warranty actions." Because the
tests are satisfied without any relationship to the tortious injury or to the
injury by breach of warranty, the construction of the various requirements
should be the same under either section." For the sake of clarity, therefore,
the tests will be analyzed here by reference to cases in which either para-
graph (4) or paragraph (5) was at issue.
In order to satisfy the restrictive language of the two paragraphs, it is
not necessary that the defendant's activity amount to "doing business" in
the technical sense.2 It has been held that a foreign corporation may be
engaged in a "persistent course of conduct" by shipping its product di-
rectly to purchasers in Virginia.
5 3
In determining what constitutes "substantial revenue," it is difficult to
identify an absolute amount which ipso facto may be deemed to be sub-
stantial. 4 The test is not whether profits are substantial, but whether
courts may disregard the additional requirements of subsection (A)(4) where the act or omis-
sion occurs outside the state, for the reason that the broader single-act statutes of other states
are constitutionally permissible. Such reasoning clearly contravenes the legislature's intent
as to when jurisdiction may be exercised in such cases. In criticism of the St. Clair rationale,
the court in Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 401 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049
(1969), observed:
In short, the court rendered nugatory the long-arm statute, and ignored limitations
embodied in the statute, asserted jurisdiction to the full extent of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing, the District Court misconceived the
role of the due process clause and misinterpreted the decisions of the Supreme Court
dealing with a state's power to exercise jurisdiction over non-residents.
401 F.2d at 161.
48. See, e.g., Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
49. HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 223.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.5. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
51. See, Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. R.v. 719, 752 (1965).
52. Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Va. 1965); HANDBOOK,
supra note 6, at 223.
53. See, e.g., Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Va. 1965);
Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962, 965 (W.D. Va. 1965).
54. Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973). In Ajax, $37,000 derived from the sale of frames was held to be
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revenue derived in the state is substantial; otherwise, a foreign corporation
could be selling all of its goods in the state but escape the jurisdiction of
the courts if the corporation happened not to profit from the sale. 5 Al-
though a percentage of total sales may be a factor to be considered in
determining whether revenue is substantial, it is not dispositive.5 A small
percentage of the sales of a corporate giant may be substantial in the
absolute sense;5 7 conversely, "a relatively small absolute amount might be
deemed 'substantial' where it constitutes a significant percentage of a
small corporation's total sales." 58 Finally, to satisfy the "substantial reve-
nue" test, it is apparent that the revenue may be derived from a single
transaction, and that the sale itself need not take place in Virginia so long
as the goods are used or consumed within the state.
4. Injury from Breach of Warranty
This provison 0 eliminates potential problems with respect to jurisdic-
tion which might have been raised as a result of past confusion as to what
type of action warranty is, in that it sounds in contract but has recovery
in tort."'
The requirement that the manufacturer or seller "might reasonably have
expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods" in
Virginia is worded almost identically to the foreseeability requirement of
Virginia's statute 2 abolishing the defense of lack of privity in products
liability actions. 3
"substantial revenue." Id. at 821. In Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp.
962 (W.D. Va. 1965), a foreign corporation derived $25,000 annually from sales in Virginia
for the period in question, compared with a total sales figure of between four and five million
dollars; the corporation was deemed to have derived substantial revenue from the sale of its
product in Virginia. Id. at 965.
55. McCormick v. Haley, 29 Ohio Misc. 97, 279 N.E.2d 642, 646 (1971).
56. Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 821-22 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Ajax Realty Corp. v. J. F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973). But see Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962, 963 (W.D.
Va. 1965), in which the court assumed that the dollar figure used represented the foreign
corporation's direct sales to Virginia customers, and did not include sales of the corporation's
products which may have originally been sold to independent companies.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.5. (Repl. Vol. 1977). See generally 22 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 152 (1965).
61. Jackson v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962, 964 (W.D. Va. 1965).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-318 (Added Vol. 1965).
63. See generally Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 752 (1965).
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Paragraph (5) deals with sales of goods outside Virginia. If a foreign
corporation makes the sale within Virginia, then paragraphs (1) or (2)
should provide for personal jurisdiction.64 The distinction is important
because if it can be shown that the sale was in the state the requirement
of paragraph (5), that there be regularity, persistent course of conduct, or
substantial revenue, need not be met.15
5. Relationship to Real Property
One obvious manner in which paragraph (6)66 applies is in causes of
action arising from real estate transactions. 7 Where a contract for the sale
of land is concluded, although it is wholly executory, the purchaser has an
equitable interest in the land.68 A foreign corporation with such an interest,
or with a legal interest, may be subject to jurisdiction under paragraph (6)
for causes of action arising out of that transaction. The fact that the seller
has sold the land in mitigation of damages and the nonresident buyer has
been divested of his equitable interest does not deprive the court of juris-
diction. 0
This provision of the long-arm statute may also be applied to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for an action in tort arising out of
the corporation's interest, use or possession of Virginia real estate.7
64. It should again be noted that each subdivision will support a cause of action under any
theory of law. See note 6 supra.
65. See notes 54-59 supra, and accompanying text for a discussion of the test of regularity,
persistent course of conduct or substantial revenue.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.6. (Repl. Vol. 1977). It should be noted here that the long-
armstatute refers to "personal jurisdiction" and does not use the term "in personam." It
could be argued that paragraph (6) includes with its scope actions in rem.
67. "For obvious reasons, legislative bodies and courts have thrown around transactions
involving real estate a large measure of protection. The stability of such transactions is of
vital concern to the state." Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707
(1968).
68. Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 208, 120 S.E. 870, 873 (1924).
69. See Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968).
70. Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968). In so holding, the court
stated as follows:
The statute gives jurisdiction at the time of, and because of, the execution of the
contract which vested in defendant an interest in land. It was then that defendant
'acted directly.' This cause of action now asserted by plaintiffs arises by virtue of an
alleged breach of that contract-a contract which gave to each party certain enforce-
able rights, and emposed upon each certain contractual obligations.
Id. at 458, 164 S.E.2d at 708.
71. See e.g., Snow v. Clark, 263 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Va. 1967). In Snow, the defendant was
held subject to personal jurisdiction under paragraph (6) for a tort action arising out of
personal injuries sustained by a painter with whom the defendant had contracted to paint
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Where, however, there is no connection between the cause of action and
the foreign corporation's relationship to real property in the state, para-
graph (6) does not apply. In Rivera v. Pocohontas Steamship Co.,7 for
example, the plaintiff's cause of action against a Delaware corporation was
for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence and the unsea-
worthiness of the defendant's vessels on the high seas. It was held that the
provision of Massachusetts' long-arm statute corresponding to Virginia's
paragraph (6)13 did not apply since there was no allegation or evidence that
the defendant's interest in Massachusetts land was in any way related to
the plaintiff's cause of action.
74
Thus, application of the long-arm statute, including paragraph (7), is
dependent upon the cause of action having arisen out of an enumerated
activity. Attention is now turned to personal jurisdiction for causes of
action unrelated to foreign corporations' activities within the Common-
wealth.
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEYOND THE LONG-ARM STATUTE
It is not entirely clear to what extent, if any, personal jurisdiction may
be obtained over a foreign corporation where the long-arm statute is for
some reason inapplicable. 5 Specifically, the question remains whether ju-
risdiction may be asserted over foreign corporations when the cause of
action is unrelated to the corporation's contacts with Virginia.
Prior to the enactment of the long-arm statute in 1964, the primary
means by which personal jurisdiction was obtained over foreign corpora-
tions was by invocation of Code section 8-60.71 This section of the Code was
employed as a jurisdictional statute embodying the old "doing business"
test.77 While the "doing business" test is generally more restrictive than
long-arm provisions, under certain circumstances it is less restrictive in
that the cause of action need not necessarily be related to the foreign
the exterior and interior of her Virginia house. Under such circumstances, paragraph (3)
should apply in nearly every case.
72. 340 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Mass. 1971).
73. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3(e) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
74. Rivera v. Pocahontas Steamship Co., 340 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (D. Mass. 1971).
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.B., authorizing jurisdiction over "foreign corporations
which are subject to service of process pursuant to the provisions of any other statute." Id.
(emphasis added). In this regard, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-307 to -308, which provide for
service of process on nonresident operators of automobiles and aircraft when such are involved
in accidents within Virginia.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.60 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (repealed 1977).
77. See generally Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 52 VA. L. REv. 719, 733 n. 81
(1965); section VI, notes 13-14 infra, and accompanying text.
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corporation's intrastate activities.7 1 When jurisdiction was grounded upon
Code section 8-60, the service of process provisions of Title 13.171 provided
the particular methods of service.
Under the long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction may be exercised only
for those causes of action which arise from the corporation's commission
of one of the statute's enumerated acts. This requirement is clear from the
wording of Code subsection 8.01-328.1.A itself. However, subsection (B) of
the long-arm statute does not limit to the long arm statute itself the meth-
ods available for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
If the two parts of subsection (B) are read together, this provision seems
to refer to statutes conferring personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions where the cause of action did not arise froin that corporation's intras-
tate activities. Subsection (B) would generally seem to permit the asser-
tion of jurisdiction under the "doing business" line of cases decided under
section 8-60 and Title 13.1 of the Code. Indeed, even after the enactment
of the long-arm statute, cases were decided in which Code section 8-60 and
one of the Title 13.1 service of process provisions constituted the manner
in which personal jurisdiction and service of process were effected.' What
must now be noted is that in the recent Code revision Section 8-60 was
repealed.2 It is therefore unclear whether "doing business" has been elimi-
nated as a viable alternative jurisdictional test, or instead will exist apart
from the statute under which it flourished.
C. JURISDICTION IN ACTIONS IN REM AND QUASI IN REM
Whereas actions in personam are directed against specific persons (in-
cluding corporations) and seek personal judgments, actions in rem are
directed "against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
78. In Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962), the
court stated as follows:
It is quite clear, however, that jurisdiction is not dependent upon the connection of
the nonresident with the transaction that gives rise to the suit before the court. What
the defendant may have done in the particular case is, of course, relevant upon the
question of liability at the trial of the case upon the merits; and it is also relevant but
not conclusive upon the question of jurisdiction. The latter must be decided after
considering the sum total of the defendant's intrastate transactions.
Id. at 914.
79. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-111, -274 (Cum. Supp. 1977); id. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
80. Id. § 8.01-328.1.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977). See note 75 supra.
81. See, e.g., Goldrick v. D. M. Picton Co., 56 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Va. 1971); Skarpelis v.
M/T Arthur P., 302 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Va. 1969).
82. The entire Title 8 was repealed and replaced by Title 8.01, in which the old § 8-60 is
not included.
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judgments with respect thereto as against the world." ' The basis of in rem
jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial
jurisdiction of the forum state.84 Thus, a judgment in rem operates against
the res, irrespective of who the owner is and irrespective of whether he is
subject to in personam jurisdiction. The third category is that of quasi in
rem jurisdiction, in which at issue are the interests of particular persons
in designated property." A suit to foreclose a mortgage on real or personal
property, for instance, has been held to be partly in personam and partly
in rem; it is in rem insofar as it seeks to seize and sell property, and it is
in personam insofar as the mortgagor's debt is concerned." As such, a
foreclosure suit falls within the definition of a quasi in rem action."
Although personal or substituted service is generally required for juris-
diction in personam, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to jurisdic-
tion, service of process in actions in rem and quasi in rem has traditionally
been more easily effected. Specifically, courts have acquired jurisdiction
in actions in rem and quasi in rem by way of service by publication.m
V. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Title 8.01 contains a statute which purports to list the methods by which
service of process on a foreign corporation may be effected.' As will be seen,
however, the list is not exhaustive. The methods prescribed in section 8.01-
301 of the Code are presented in the alternative, which may be contrasted
to the consecutive manner prescribed for service on natural persons.
2
A. PERSONAL SERVICE
If the foreign corporation is authorized to do business in Virginia,3 per-
83. O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 186 Va. 325, 336, 42 S.E.2d 269, 275 (1947). For a discussion of
the distinctions between in personam, in rem and quasi in rem actions in a procedural due
process context, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977). See generally section VI, notes
3-35 infra, and accompanying text.
84. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
85. Id. at 246 n.12.
86. Hall v. Milligan, 221 Ala. 233, 128 So. 438, 439 (1930).
87. Id. The court in Milligan did not use the term quasi in rem, but rather concluded that
when no personal judgment is sought, a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage is essentially a
proceeding in rem.
88. For a discussion of service by publication, see section V, notes 19-23 infra, and accom-
panying text.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-301 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
2. See Id. § 8.01-296.
3. See Id. § 13.1-106 (Cum. Supp. 1977); §§ 13.1-107 to -108 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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sonal service may be made on any officer, director, or on the corporation's
registered agent, wherever they may be found within Virginia.4 If the
foreign corporation is not authorized to do business in Virginia, personal
service may be made on any agent of the corporation, wherever he may be
found within Virginia.'
B. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
An alternative method under Code section 8.01-301 for service on a for-
eign corporation authorized to transact business is by substituted service
in accordance with Code section 13.1-111,1 for stock corporations, or Code
section 13.1-274,J for non-stock corporations. These two provisions of Title
13.1 are worded identically. Under each, service may be on the corpora-
tion's registered agent, or on the Clerk of the State Corporation Commis-
sion (S.C.C.) or any of his staff at his office.8 If the latter method is
employed, the clerk is to "forthwith" cause process to be sent by registered
or certified mail to the foreign corporation at its registered office. In the
case of withdrawal9 of the foreign corporation from Virginia, the mailing
address is to be the address shown in the corporation's statement of with-
drawal.' 0
Where the foreign corporation is not authorized to do business in Vir-
ginia, substituted service may be effected in accordance with section 13.1-
119 of the Code." Under Code section 13.1-119, substituted service may be
made on the clerk of the S.C.C. if no director, officer or agent of the
corporation can be found. The clear implication is that some effort must
first be made to effect personal service on unauthorized corporations before
attempting substituted service on the S.C.C. This may be contrasted to
4. Id. § 8.01-301.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 13.1-111 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
7. Id. § 13.1-274. This provision is identical in wording to id. § 13.1-111.
8. Where the process is being issued by the State Corporation Commission itself, the Clerk
of the S.C.C. is not deemed a statutory agent for service. Rather, the S.C.C. is to mail process
by registered or certified mail to the corporation at its registered office. Id. §§ 13.1-111, -274
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
9. See id. § 13.1-115 regarding the procedure for the withdrawal of authorized foreign
corporations.
10. Id. §§ 13.1-111, -274.
11. Id. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962), wherein
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that it must be shown that a defendant is "doing
business" in the state in order to give him notice by substituted service within the constitu-
tional requirement of "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 914, quoting, International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See generally section VI infra.
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the provisions for service on authorized corporations,' 2 which simply imply
a choice of either method.
C. SERVICE UNDER THE LONG-ARM STATUTE
Whether the foreign corporation is authorized or not, if jurisdiction is
based upon the long-arm statute, service of process may be effected in
accordance with section 8.01-329 of the Code.'" This provision lists three
alternative methods of service. First, service may be in the same manner
as is provided in Chapter 8 of Title 8.01 "in any other case in which
personal jurisdiction is exercised over such a nonresident party ... .""
With regard to foreign corporations, this undoubtedly refers to Code sec-
tion 8.01-3011- and is intended to permit substituted service on the Clerk
of the S.C.C. wherever long-arm jurisdiction may be asserted.'6 Second,
12. Id. §§ 13.1-111, -274 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. Id. § 8.01-329 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
14. Id. § 8.01-329.A.
15. Id. § 8.01-309.
16. "[Section] 8.01-301 effects a substantive change in former law by allowing service in
the alternative [i.e., at the option of the plaintiff under Title 13.1 or under the Long-Arm
Statute] in cases where the prerequisites are met for long-arm jurisdiction over foreign
corporations." CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra section I, note 1 at 201-02.
The Revisers' Note following § 8.01-301 also states that under the now repealed § 8-81.3
service could be made on the Secretary of the Commonwealth for unauthorized foreign corpo-
rations but not for authorized foreign corporations. Under § 8-81.3 service of process could
be made on the Secretary of the Commonwealth as statutory agent only if there was no other
provision of the Code providing service of process over the corporation. Since § § 13.1-111 and
13.1-274 were applicable to authorized corporations, service could never be effected against
authorized foreign corporations under § 8-81.3. CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra section I, note
1, at 201. The Revisers then state that since §§ 13.1-111 and 13.1-274 do not apply to unau-
thorized corporations, service on such corporations could be had under the former § 8-81.3.
Inexplicably, § 13.1-119 is not mentioned in the CODE COMM'N REPORT. As that section pro-
vides for substituted service of process upon the clerk of the S.C.C. for unauthorized corpora-
tions, it would appear that service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth was precluded for
unauthorized as well as authorized foreign corporations under § 8-81.3.
Another unexplained omission of § 13.1-119 occurs in § 8.91-301. Section 8.01-301 incorpo-
rates the provisions for substituted service upon authorized corporations, §§ 13.1-111 and
13.1-274, but not the provision for such service on unauthorized corporations, which is § 13.1-
119. As § 8.01-301 purports to be a list of methods of service upon foreign corporations, it is
unfortunate that it makes such an omission. A result of that omission can be seen with respect
to service of process under the long-arm statute. As discussed, service under the long-arm
statute may be the same manner as is provided in Chapter 8. Since § 13.1-119 is not included
by reference in Chapter 8, as are §§ 13.1-111 and 13.1-274, does this mean that there may
not be service on the S.C.C. in the case of unauthorized foreign corporations? Clearly, the
intention of the revisers was to provide for service on either the S.C.C. or the Secretary of
State for both authorized and unauthorized foreign corporations. See Revisers' Note [CODE
CoMM'N REPORT], VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-301 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Despite the statement by the
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service may be on any agent of the foreign corporation in the county or city
in which he resides." Third, service under the long-arm statute may be on
the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia, who is deemed a statutory
agent for service of process.18
D. SERVICE BY PUBLICATION FOR ACTIONS IN REM AND QUASI IN REM
Service of process on a foreign corporation may also be effected by an
order of publication where jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem is authorized,
regardless of whether the corporation is authorized to transact business in
Virginia.'" Under such circumstances the order of publication must be
entered in accordance with Code sections 8.01-31611 and 8.01-317.21 It is
sufficient under section 8.01-316 of the Code that the party seeking service
of process by entry of an order of publication file an affidavit stating that
the party to be served is a foreign corporation. The order of publication
itself should conform to the requirements of Code section 8.01-317 as to
what information must be included. One change in the law made by Code
section 8.01-317, intended to correct the confusion under former Code sec-
tion 8-72,22 is the new requirement that the order of publication contain a
specific date by which the party served must appear and defend his inter-
ests. The date stated in the order is to be no sooner than fifty days after
entry of the order. The clerk of court is then required to cause copies of
the order to be posted, mailed, and transmitted to the designated newspa-
per within ten days after the entry of the order of publication.?
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF STATE COURT
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Determining the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation is a two-step process. First, it must be found that the
cause of action is within the ambit of the state's statutes' making the
Revisers that § 8.01-301 "eliminates such unnecessary intricacies," confusion and intricacies
may not necessarily have been eliminated.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
18. Id. Where service is made on the Secretary pursuant to this section, the statutory
requirements of id. § 8.01-329.B. must be observed.
19. Id. § 8.01-301.4. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of such service by
order of publication, see section VI infra.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-301.4. (Repl. Vol. 1977). The provision referred to is id. § 8.01-
316.
21. Id. § 8.01-301.4. The provision referred to is id. § 8.01-317.
22. Id. § 8-72 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
23. Id. § 8.01-317 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
1. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-301 td -328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977); section IV supra. See also
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defendant amenable to the service of process. Second, such assertion of
jurisdiction must be consistent with requirements of due process.' An over-
view of the development of the current due process limits is a necessary
prelude to an analysis of the application of those limits in the Virginia law.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS: TERRITORIAL POWER TO MINIMUM CONTACTS
1. Personal Jurisdicton
For a century the bulwark of American jurisdictional law was the 1877
case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 which established a strict territorial concept of
state power to adjudicate.' Pennoyer raised to the level of constitutional
significance the position that the exercise of judicial "power" was governed
by one set of rules when the action was in personam and that another set
of rules applied when the action was one in rem or quasi in rem.5
The most recent explanation of the concepts of in personam and in rem
jurisdiction is contained in the majority opinion in the case of Shaffer v.
Heitner where the "power" concept of Pennoyer was finally abandoned.'
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person,
the action and judgment are denominated "in personam" and can impose a
personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. § 410.10 (Cum. Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (Cum.
Supp. 1968).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The protean nature of due process demands and other consti-
tutional limitations has resulted in a long and tangled history of jurisdictional concepts. See,
e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241
[hereinafter cited as Hazard]; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren & Traut-
man]; Note, Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Id. Justice Field, writing for the majority, posited that a state has plenary power over
persons and property within its borders and that no state could by its laws affect or bind
either persons or property not within its territory. Id. at 722. See also, Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem
Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 668, 669 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Zammit].
5. 95 U.S. at 724-28, 732-35. Pennoyer stood for the proposition that although personal
service was necessary to effect an in personam judgment against a defendant, substituted
service by publication on a non-resident defendant was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction where
his property within the forum was seized either as a means to satisfy a judgment or as the
subject matter of the suit.
6. 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
7. See notes 35-38 infra, and accompanying text. The territorial power concept authorized
a state to assert jurisdiction over persons and property within its boundaries despite the lack
of any relationship existing between the forum, the defendant and the litigation.
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is based on the court's power over property within its territory, the action is
called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of a judgment in such a case is
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a
personal liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court.8
Pennoyer, however, despite its assumption that judicial authority could
be exercised over property without at the same time being exercised over
the person,' did establish the groundwork for two early justifications for
extra-territorial assertions of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions.8 Thus, under the consent rationale, by doing business in a state, a
foreign corporation "consented" to suit in that forum." To facilitate the
institution of suit against foreign corporatons under this theory, the state
requirement that the corporation appoint an agent in the state to receive
service of process against the corporation was a reasonable condition upon
the privilege of doing business there. 2
A second theory justifying personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations
held that, by conducting business activities within the state, a corporation
was "present" there and was therefore validly within the jurisdictional
power of the state's courts.'3 Presence, like consent, was a legal conclusion
based on a determination that particular corporate activities within the
forum state reached the level of "doing business,"' 4 thus subjecting the
8. 97 S.Ct. at 2577. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), Justice Marshall articulated
the distinction between in rem and quasi in rem actions:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A judg-
ment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated property.
The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim
in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar
interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he con-
cedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Id. at 246.
9. "All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings
or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected." Tyler v. Court of Registration,
175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). See also, W. COOK,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 60 (1942); Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 663 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1969).
10. 95 U.S. at 735.
11. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
12. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1914); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-82 (1868).
13. See Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
14. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914). The Supreme Court
held that "doing business" within the state was the essential requirement of jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation. Id. at 583. But in this case, it was found that the "doing business"
manifested "presence" and thus justified the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tion.
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foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction.
The consent and presence fictions and the difficulties with the "doing
business" test'" were replaced by a new standard in International Shoe v.
Washington.16 Outlining the current limits of due process for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, the Court held that the
defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the state] . ..
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' ",v Thus the focus is on the nature of
the defendant's relationship to the forum rather than on the "power" con-
siderations of Pennoyer.5
A broad reading of International Shoe was limited, arguably, by the case
of Hanson v. Denckla, 9 which requires a threshold determination that the
defendant's activities manifest some "purposeful availment" of the privi-
15. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Green v. Chicago, B &
Q Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The question involved was whether the courts of the state of
Washington could assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose agents were
present in the state in an action to collect unemployment taxes levied on those agents'
salaries.
17. Id. at 316.
18. With this type of focus, considerations such as the inconvenience to the defendant of
defending suit in a distant forum become relevant. Id. at 317. International Shoe also made
clear that a single act, by its quality and nature, might be enough to justify finding the
corporation liable to suit. Id. at 318. Read restrictively, however, the case requires that the
cause of action arise out of forum-related activities. Id. at 320-21.
Applying the minimum contacts test in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950), the Court found sufficient contacts to satisfy due process in the company's mail
solicitations, its investigations within the state of benefit claims, a membership including 800
Virginia residents, and the state's interest in protecting its citizens from insurance risks. The
next year, in Perkins v. Benguet Mining Company, 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court upheld
Ohio's assertion of jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation where the cause of action was
unrelated to the company's forum activity, saying that such was neither compelled nor
prohibited by the due process clause but was within state legislative discretion. The case
involved a stock dispute, filed by a nonresident against the Philippine corporation whose
president had carried on the corporate business from Ohio during the Japanese occupation
of the Islands. The case can be seen as one of jurisdiction by necessity due to the unavailabil-
ity of an alternative forum but it points out the potential elasticity of the fairness test,
balancing the interests of the plaintiff and the forum against the inconvenience to the defen-
dant. See Developments, supra note 2, at 932.
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). A Florida probate court sought to assert personal jurisdiction over
the trustee of a Delaware trust and in rem jurisdiction over the corpus of the trust. It was
held that due process not only forbids the exercise of jurisdiction over the delaware trustee
who had manifested no "purposeful availment" of the forum state but also forbids such an
exercise of jurisdiction over the corpus of a trust located in another state, denying, in these




leges of conducting business in the forum state."0 But in requiring only that
there be "some act"'" to show this "purposeful availment" it appears that
the Court was again validating the exercise of state court jurisdiction
where the cause of action does not arise out of forum-related activities.2
2. In Rem and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiciton
The erosion of Pennoyer principles relative to jurisdiction over persons
outside a state's territory, culminating in the International Shoe
"minimum contacts" and fairness standard did not extend to the tenet
that a state had plenary power over property within its borders until the
case of Shaffer v. Heitner,n decided in 1977. Prior to Shaffer, an owner of
property, tangible or intangible, could be sued anywhere his property could
be located, regardless of how fleeting the forum contact with the property.1
The case of Harris v. Balkh established that jurisdiction was proper wher-
ever the debtor (garnishee) of a nonresident defendant could be found, the
garnishee's debt to the principal defendant being the res which could be
seized to obtain jurisdiction. The actions involved actual or symbolic sei-
zure (attachment or garnishment) of the property. The plaintiff's recovery
was limited by the value of the property seized because the "power" of the
state did not extend to the person of the nonresident owner."8
The Pennoyer-Harris theories have been used to obtain jurisdiction over
foreign corporations by attaching debts owed them by entities servable in
the forum state.Y Under the Pennoyer reasoning, seizure was equated with
notice and publication was deemed sufficient to satisfy due process in such
proceedings rather than the personal service required for personal jurisdic-
tion. However, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company es-
20. 357 U.S. at 253. See also, Note, The Cornelison Doctrine: A New Jurisdictional
Approach, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 458, 481 (1977).
21. 357 U.S. at 253.
22. See, Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test
of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300, 309 (1970).
23. 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
24. Commerce clause considerations, however, exercised some control over this kind of
action when the property involved was chattel in transit through the state. See notes 79-83
infra, and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CoNFLcr OF LAws, §§ 56
comment (a), 60 (1971).
25. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
26. Id. See Jurisdiction In Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power
Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 730-31.
27. See Steele v. G. D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973); Lefebvre-Armistead Co.
v. Southern Pac. Co., 142 Va. 800, 128 S.E. 244 (1925).
28. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The case involved a New York statute which permitted trust
companies to pool small trust estates into one common fund for investment and also allowed
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tablished that due process notice requirements did not depend on a me-
chanical classification of the action and that the type of service most
reasonably calculated to give notice and opportunity to be heard to the
absent property owner was necessary.29
In Shaffer v. Heitner,0 the Court overruled the Pennoyer-Harris line of
cases to the extent that it allowed jurisdiction based on the presence of a
nonresident owner's property regardless of the relationship between the
forum, the litigation and the defendant.3 ' The holding has constitution-
alized the application of "minimum contacts" and fairness standards to
govern actions in rem as well as those in personam121
Shaffer involved a derivative suit brought for breach of duty by a nonres-
ident in Delaware against the directors of a Delaware-chartered corpora-
tion. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the lower court's assertion
of jurisdiction based on the seizure of the defendants' stock options and
other stock privileges, "present" in Delaware under a statute assigning a
Delaware situs to all stock of corporations chartered in the state.3 3 The
stock seized was unrelated to the cause of action; the corporation was
headquartered and had its principal place of business elsewhere; the defen-
dants were nonresidents and had never been present in Delaware. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that such an assertion of quasi in rem
notice of judicial settlement of fund accounts to beneficiaries by publication in a local news-
paper. It was held that such notice by publication, although valid under due process require-
ments as to beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown, did not comport with due process
as to those beneficiaries whose addresses were known. Notice by mail was found to be suffi-
cient for the latter category of beneficiaries.
29. Id. at 317-19. See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
30. 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
31. Id. at 2585 n. 39.
32. Lower courts have been arguing for such a change increasingly. See, e.g., Jonnet v.
Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Atkin-
son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied
sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). See also, Ehren-
zweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 'Power' Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard, supra note 2; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 2.
"Insofar as courts remain given to asking 'Res, res-who's got the res?' they cripple their
evaluation of the real factors that should determine jurisdiction." Traynor, supra note 9, at
663.
33. 8 DEL. C. § 169 (1974 Rev. Vol.). Another Delaware statute allowed jurisdictional
sequestration, the equitable counterpart of attachment, and was used by the plaintiff to
"compel the personal appearance of [the] nonresident defendant[s] to answer and defend




jurisdiction, where the defendants had no significant contacts with the
forum, was a violation of due process. 4
The import of International Shoe and Shaffer is that the "minimun
contacts" test is now required to be met for all assertions of state court
jurisdiction over foreign corporations or individuals. 5 The standard can be
an elastic one, stretching or contracting to meet the demands of fairness
34. It was rendered that the acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation, head-
quartered and conducting business elsewhere, was not "purposeful availment" of the privi-
leges and protections of the forum under the Hanson rationale. Also, the opinion points out
that Delaware does not have a long-arm statute, nor a statute treating acceptance of a
directorship as consent to the jurisdiction of the state of incorporation, so that the defendants
had no reasonable expectation of being subject to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts. Shaffer
v. Heitner, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586 (1977).
35. The effects and application of Shaffer principles remain to be seen. It might be said
that the Court was, simply, ready to take this step and any convenient case could have
provided the vehicle. Here there were clearly other avenues for disposing of the case without
cutting such a broad swath. For example, the Court might have invalidated the statutory
scheme which required the defendants to enter a general appearance to seek release of their
property. See 97 S.Ct. at 2573. Such analysis is outside the scope of this Note and remains
to be handled by the commentators.
Two recent lower court decisions evidence a very broad reading of Shaffer. In the first,
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977), it was
held that California could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a debt owed by a Califor-
nia company to a French company in an attachment action where the property attached
served as security for a possible judgment in favor of the North Carolina plaintiff against the
French company in another forum where valid in personam jurisdiction could be asserted over
the defendant. The court construed Shaffer to allow such a limited assertion of jurisdiction
where there were insufficient contacts with the forum for adjudication of the issues relating
to the controversy, but sufficient contacts to justify attachment of defendant's property
present in the state due to the defendant's contract obligations to a forum corporation, to
secure satisfaction of any recovery from the action pending in another forum.
The second case, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 46 U.S.L.W. 2184 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
1977), involved the attachment of an insuror's obligation to defend and indemnify the nonres-
ident defendant as the jurisdictional basis of a New York plaintiff's wrongful death claim
against a Virginia resident arising from an accident in Virginia. This is known as a Seider
action, stemming from the much-criticized case of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The O'Connor court acknowledged that the Virginia defendants
had no minimum contacts with New York, but declared that the type of jurisdiction sought
to be exercised in the significant factor in assessing whether the demands of fundamental
fairness have been met.
In holding that Shaffer does not require dismissal of this type of action, the court appar-
ently placed great weight on the legal relationship arising between the tortfeasors and the
decedent's dependents and the plaintiffs interest in litigating in the forum of her residence.
It also qualifies the use of this type of attachment of an obligation by the restrictions that
such attachment is available only to forum residents and only against insurors amenable to
suit in the forum state. The court also emphasized that an attachment action probably would
not prejudice the defendant's right to relitigate any issues in a suit for an amount in excess
of that recovered in the attachment-based action.
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as gauged by the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum,
but it finally discards the territorial power notions of Pennoyer. Due pro-
cess requires that there be some relationship between the defendant and
the forum, characterized as "minimum contacts", whether the exercise of
state jurisdiction is based on the state's power over his person or his prop-
erty. The first step of the bipartite evaluation of the validity of state court
exercises of jurisdiction, determining whether the nonresident's person or
property is within the range of the state statutory scheme, has been dealt
with relative to Virginia law in section IV. The second step, determining
whether assertions of jurisdiction in such circumstances comport with due
process and other constitutional limitations, is the subject of the following
section.
B. MINIMUM CoNTAcTs AND VIRGINIA LAW
1. Long-Arm Jurisdiction
Prior to the enactment of the Virginia long-arm statute in 19646 personal
jurisdiction was asserted over foreign corporations under one of several
statutes found in Title 8 and Title 13.1 of the Virginia code" which author-
ized service of process on an agent or registered agent of a foreign corpora-
tion, or on the Secretary of the State Corporation Commission. The statu-
tory scheme presented an intricate and confusing choice situation for the
plaintiffs attorney seeking to get a foreign corporation into court. 8 These
statutes presented no constitutional problems, since corporations author-
ized to do business in the state "consented" to its jurisdiction and those
not authorized were deemed "present" for jurisdictional purposes when
they were found to be doing business in Virginia."
The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe was the "green
light" for state legislators to codify the requisite "minimum contacts" for
valid assertions of jurisdiction over nonresidents, persons and corpora-
tions." According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Virginia long-arm
36. Originally codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp. 1964), now codified in id. §
8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
37. Id. § 8-60 (Repl. Vol. 1957), now incorporated into and codified at id. § 8.01-301 (Repl.
Vol. 1977); id. §§ 13.1-111, -274 (Cum. Supp. 1976); id. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
38. See Reviser's Note [CODE COMM'N REPORT] VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-301 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
39. See notes 9-14 supra, and accompanying text.
40. See generally, Sutton, Today's Long-Arm and Products Liability: A Plea for a Contem-
porary Notion of Fair Play and Substantial Justice, 41 INs. L.J. 85, 89 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Sutton]. Prior to the enactment of the Virginia long-arm statute, the courts of the
Commonwealth were already using the "minimum contacts" standard of fairness in connec-
tion with Virginia service of process statutes.
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statute is "a deliberate and conscious effort on the part of the General
Assembly of Virginia to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
the extent permissible by the Due Process Clause."" The statute has been
further interpreted as embodying both the "minimum contacts" and the
"purposeful availment" requirements.42 The overriding concern of the draf-
ters was that only causes of action from the acts enumerated43 should allow
personal jurisdiction. This would seem to preclude such assertions of juris-
diction as were validated in federal district court cases in which Virginia
law was applied, but which arose before the long-arm statute was enacted,
and which involved causes of action unrelated to the defendant's forum
activities." This aspect of the Virginia long-arm statute appears more
restrictive than due process requires.45
The Virginia long-arm statute is based on section 1.03 of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act" which forms the basis for the
long-arm statutes of sixteen states.47 Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(A),48 covering causes of action arising from the defendant's "transacting
any business" or "contracting to supply services or things" in Virginia,
present the most probable constitutional problems. If the transaction or
the contract giving rise to the cause of action is the only contact of the
defendant with the state, such a single act may not be sufficient, under
constitutional scrutiny, to permit personal jurisdiction.4" The Virginia
cases show. that the courts will stretch to find other forum-related activities
on which to buttress the assertion of jurisdiction based on these para-
graphs."
Paragraphs (3) and (4)51 of the Virginia long-arm statute give personal
jurisdiction in tortious injury cases where the act causing the injury occurs
in Virginia or outside Virginia if a further nexus exists between the defen-
dant and Virginia. This is the second aspect of the Virginia long-arm
41. Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703, 707 (1968). See notes 42-45
infra, and accompanying text.
42. See John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va., 736, 180 S.E.2d 644 (1971).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
44. See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Silas
v. Paroh Steamship Co., 175 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.Va. 1958).
45. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1951).
46. 13 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 279, 285 (1975).
47. See Sutton, supra note 40, at 89-90 for a list of the particular states adopting the
Uniform Law and generally for the other types of long-arm statutes currently in effect in 49
states.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.1. & 2. (RepI. Vol. 1977).
49. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
50. See section IV, notes 9-15 supra, and accompanying text.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.a.3. & 4. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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statute which may be more restrictive than due process requires and is
more restrictive than the "single act" tort clauses found in the long-arm
statutes in other states.2
Paragraph (5)53 relates to breach of warranty actions where the sale
occurs outside Virginia. The exercise of personal jurisdiction under this
paragraph requires the same substantial relationship between the defen-
dant and the forum as does paragraph (4) and, by this incorporation of a
"minimum contacts" analysis, precludes any constitutional problems. It
has been held that the words "regularly", "persistent", and "substantial",
found in this paragraph and paragraph (4) are "International Shoe due
process words . . ., " and place the paragraph well within due process
limits. There is also included a caveat that the defendant must have been
able to reasonably foresee that his product would be used in Virginia. This
foreseeability requirement in the products liability area is an interpreta-
tion of the Hanson requirement of "purposeful availment". 5
Paragraph (6)50 relates to causes of action arising out of "having an
interest in, using or possessing real property" in Virginia. The Supreme
Court of Virginia expressed approval of this legislative enactment in a case
where the interest in real property required of the defendant did not exist
at the time of the suit, holding that jurisdiction under this section is
grounded on the relationship between the defendant and the realty at the
time the cause of action arose. 7 It appears that cases arising under this
section most often present the situation of a plaintiff who was injured while
on the property of a nonresident."'
A more difficult problem under paragraph (6) is whether the paragraph
authorizes personal liability in an action which, under traditional classifi-
52. See HANDBOOK supra section IV, note 5, at 223. See also Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The constitutionality of a
single-act statute has not been considered by the Supreme Court, but the lower courts are in
accord as to their constitutionality. The state's interest in affording a forum to a tortiously
injured plaintiff is seen as sufficient to outweigh the defendant's inconvenience in defending
in that forum. Likewise, the use of a defendant's product within the state is seen as a
reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's participation in some aspect of interstate
commerce. See also Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal.2d
893, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57 (1969).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.5. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
54. Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Va. 1965).
55. See Sutton, supra note 40, at 91. See also Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d
818 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Jackson v. National Linen Service
Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Va. 1965).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.6. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
57. Carmichael v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968.
58. See, e.g., Snow v. Clark, 263 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Va. 1967).
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cations, is seen as an action in rem. The statute clearly authorizes personal
jurisdiction based on the presence of property but it does not answer the
question of whether in rem rules apply, i.e., is the defendant's liability
limited to the value of the property? Does it make attachment unnecessary
in actions involving title to real property? The questions remain unan-
swered in statutory or case law and the commentators are in conflict." But,
under the holdings of International Shoe and Shaffer, minimum contacts
analysis clearly is required and the presence of the property alone may not
be sufficient to justify the assertion of jurisdiction.
The "contracting to insure" paragraph of the Virginia long-arm statute0
is a legislative finding that such a contract is, of itself, a sufficient
"minimum contact" when the insured person, property or risk was in
Virginia at the time of contracting and would appear constitutionally
sound under the holding of McGee v. International Life Insurance
Company.6'
The reach of the Virginia long-arm statute is far-ranging, even though
limited somewhat by its "cause of action arising from" requirement. Prior
to its enactment, foreign attachment was the traditional means for procur-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign corporation insufficiently present to be found
to be doing business. 2 Under Pennoyer principles, the mere presence of the
nonresident's property gave the state power to adjudicate rights to the
property. Under the recent Shaffer holding, attachment remains a method
of securing jurisdiction in actions in rem or quasi in rem but is subject now
to the standards of fairness and "minimum contacts." 3
2. Attachment
The Virginia attachment statutes64 allow attachment proceedings to be
begun by any person- which includes both domestic and foreign corpora-
59. See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff,
43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 617 n. 61 (1977); Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and the Attachment of
Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 740-41. But cf., Note, The
Virginia "Long-Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 753 (1965).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1.A.7. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
61. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The case held that a single insurance contract was a sufficient
minimum contact to subject the nonresident insuror to jurisdiction based on the forum state's
interest in providing a forum for its citizens to enforce contracts made with nonresidents, the
inconvenience to the plaintiff of having to go to the defendant's domicile for a small claim,
and the availability of witnesses in the forum state. Id. at 223.
62. See Lefebvre-Armistead Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 142 Va. 800, 128 S.E. 244 (1925).
63. See notes 30-35 supra, and accompanying text.
64. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-533, -576 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
65. Id. § 8.01-533.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tions. 6 The primary grounds for attachment for purposes of this discussion
are that "the principal defendant or one of them, if there are more than
one, be a foreign corporation ... and have estate or have debts owing to
such defendant . . . . The word 'estate'. . . shall include all rights or
interests of a pecuniary nature which can be protected, enforced, or pro-
ceeded against in courts of law or equity . . . ."I If the claim is for a "debt
not due and payable no attachment shall be sued out when the only ground
. . . is that the defendant ... is a foreign corporation." 9 But the mere fact
of being a foreign corporation is sufficient ground where the claim is for
"any specific personal property, or a like claim to any debt, including rent
• . . or to damages for breach of any contract, express or implied, or to
damages for a wrong. . .,"0 and the foreign corporate defendant has prop-
erty or debts owed it in the city or county where the proceedings are
begun.' Thus the attachment action is authorized under Virginia law
where the only nexus between the defendant and the state is the presence
of his property, an impermissible authorization under the Shaffer holding.
The courts of the Commonwealth now are required to apply a "minimum
contacts" analysis when attachment is sought on the grounds that the
defendant is a foreign corporation.
The attachment remedy is used frequently to secure property to satisfy
a pending claim between the plaintiff and defendant.7 2 In this situation,
where the defendant is already before the court, there would be no
"minimum contacts" problems. Attachment is also frequently employed
in cases where the attached property is the basis of the cause of action. As
Justice Marshall points out in Shaffer, "when claims to the property itself
are the source of the underlying controversy ... it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.""
66. See Video Eng'r Co. v. Foto-Video Electronics, Inc., 207 Va. 1027, 154 S.E.2d 7 (1967).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-533 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
68. Id. § 8.01-534. The other grounds for attachment relate to situations where there is
some evidence of the debtor's intent to defraud creditors and the remedy is a security device
to prevent such defrauding.
69. Id. § 8.01-533.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 8.01-534.
72. See Snow v. Clark, 263 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Va. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-574 (Repl.
Vol. 1977).
73. 97 S.Ct. at 2582. Cf., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 60, comments c,
d; (1969). Traynor, supra note 9, at 672-73. For analyses of the procedural due process
problems found in attachment, garnishment and detinue proceedings, see North Georgia
Finishing, Inc., v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969). See also Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets
the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973).
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Satisfying the "minimum contacts" standard of fairness most probably
will create problems where attachment is sought purely as a means of
gaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant not otherwise ame-
nable to the service of process. And where "minimum contacts" exist, the
defendant will most likely be amenable under the long-arm statute, reduc-
ing the utility of the attachment remedy to that of securing property to
satisfy a pending claim, or to save property from destruction or removal.74
Where the defendant can be brought in under long-arm service, that form
of proceeding would logically be chosen to avoid procedural difficulties and
a judgment limited by the value of the property seized.'5
A separate problem relative to the Virginia attachment statutes is that
they authorize service by order of publication where the defendant is a
nonresident." However, the publication statutes require the clerk to mail
the notice to the defendant, satisfying the requirements of Mullane."
3. Commerce Clause
The burden imposed on interstate commerce is another aspect to be
considered in a discussion of the assertion of state court jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. The commerce clause limitation focuses on the
"imposition on the defendant's business insofar as it serves to impair the
public interest in an open economy .... "I In a case involving a North
Carolina statute which gave the state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
which produced or distributed goods with the "reasonable expectation that
those goods are to be used or consumed in this State. . ., " the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that to "sustain jurisdiction here would not
only be offensive to the due process clause, but it would involve the danger
of grave burdens and impediments to interstate commerce, if the door
should be opened to similar legislation by other States." 0 The opinion
74. See, e.g., Zammit, supra note 4, at 681.
75. "The attachment cases are appropriately limited by the minimum contacts rule to
situations where either the obligation secured by the attachment arose from a transaction
with local elements, in which case there is plenary jurisdiction because of minimum contacts
anyway, or where plaintiff can show that attachment is probably necessary if he is to realize
on his claim, in which case attachment is employed for its proper use as a security device."
Hazard, supra note 2, at 282-83. See also, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Absent Parties: Steele
v. G. D. Searle & Co., 60 VA. L. Rav. 1086, 1097 (1974).
76. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-301.4., -316, -317 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
77. 399 U.S. 306, 319 (1950). See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
78. Developments, supra note 2, at 985.
79. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1956) (emphasis in
original).
80. Id. at 507. See also Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924);
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implies that expanding jurisdictional concepts following International
Shoe may give rise to a renewed use of the commerce clause as a limitation
on state court jurisdiction. This may yet be seen in states whose long-arm
statutes expressly go "to the limits of due process"'" but the application
of a meaningful "minimum contacts" test should preclude the need for
courts to resurrect the commerce clause limitation.8 2
4. Summary
The combination of expanded in personam jurisdiction in the wake of
International Shoe and jurisdictional attachment with quasi in rem juris-
diction, permitted a plaintiff with no relationship to the forum to obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant with no relationship to the forum and made
meaningless any limits on a state's power to adjudicate. Shaffer has ended
that era and due process now requires that all assertions of jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations or individuals pass muster under the "minimum
contacts" standard of fairness. All traditional tests of jurisdiction are now
replaced by one that balances the conflicting interests of the defendant,
the plaintiff and the forum in order to reach a result consonant with funda-
mental fairness. The presence of a claim arising out of one of the acts
enumerated in the long-arm statute, or the presence of a res owned by a
nonresident, is a signal of some relationship existing between the defen-
dant and the forum. Whether that relationship satisfies "minimum con-
tacts" analysis is the question to be answered in every case. Where jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation is sought, notwithstanding the validity of
service of process or the type of action involved, the courts will now have
to scrutinize the facts presented in order to ascertain whether sufficient
contacts exist to allow the court to subject the defendant to its jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The enactment of Title 8.01 has made clearer, both substantively and
organizationally, Virginia's statutory scheme relative to jurisdiction, venue
and service of process. The new provisions set forth more clearly than did
Title 8 the procedures and requirements for valid jurisdiction, creating a
system which will save time and energy for attorneys and unnecessary
costs for clients. Litigants in Virginia now should be spared frustration and
Davis v. Farmer's Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. ANN. § 410.10 (Cum. Supp. 1976); R. I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-5-33 (1970).
82. The opinion in International Shoe, however, can be seen as a validation of the com-
merce clause argument. 326 U.S. at 315. See also Wilcox v. Richmond, Fredericksburg &
Potomac R. Co., 270 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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inequitable results by the new provisions for statewide service of process
and those distinguishing jurisdiction from venue. The simplification and
expansion of the means for substituted service upon the statutory agents
of corporations should also facilitate obtaining valid service of process. As
is true of any statutory scheme, certain provisions will raise questions
requiring interpretation by the courts. In general, however, the procedures
for bringing a corporation before the proper court have been made much
less problematical by the revision of Virginia's code of civil procedure.

